Last week, Air Chief Marshal BS Dhanoa sent a personal letter to nearly 12,000 officers of the Indian Air Force (IAF), asking them to be prepared for operations "at a very short notice". The 'personal' letter is believed to be the first of its kind written by an Indian air chief – though it is known that two army chiefs, Field Marshal KM Cariappa in May 1950 and General K Sundarji in February 1986, had sent similar letters to the Indian Army officers.
Of course, in his personal letter, the air
chief has written on a plethora of issues, all intended to boost the
morale of his officers, but the timing of his letter seems to be
influenced by the deteriorating relations with Pakistan and heightening
of insurgency in Jammu & Kashmir. In fact, the air chief’s
letter assumes further significance amidst reports that India may be
forced to fight a two-front war in the future, given China’s increasing
bellicosity. Reports suggest that faced with a two-front war scenario
against Pakistan and China, the IAF will deploy its latest Rafale combat aircraft –
36 of them are to be procured from France – at Ambala in Haryana
(keeping in mind Pakistan) and Hasimara in West Bengal (to meet the
Chinese challenge).
It
may be noted in this context that in January this year, Chief of Army
Staff (COAS) General Bipin Rawat had said that the Indian Army was prepared to simultaneously fight a two-front war against Pakistan and China.
"As far as the armed forces are concerned, we are asked to be prepared for a two-front war and I think we are capable of carrying out our task in whatever manner that we may be asked to do so by the political hierarchy," Rawat said.
All these lead to three questions: Will
there be a war? If there is a war, will it be a two-front war? And if it
is a two-front war, how will India, particularly the IAF, perform?
In
regard to the first question, the possibility of a war with Pakistan
cannot be ruled out. Wars, in the ultimate analysis, are 'rational
choices' by the States; this means that leaders of the States are
rational, responsible and accountable when they go to war, whether in
defence or offence. And, as long as wars are the rational choices, their
likelihood is less.
But when a State does not have rational
decision-makers, as seems to be the case with Pakistan (given the
increasing religious radicalisation of its Army, which, in turn, has
established its preponderance in the nation’s decision-making), a war on
India on the western front is always a distinct possibility.
In
the event of a war with Pakistan, will China help Pakistan? Such a
scenario is highly unlikely because of three reasons. First, unlike in
Pakistan, Chinese leaders – though authoritarians – are reputed to be
among the most rational actors. In order to make itself the world’s most
preeminent power, China needs to strengthen its economic might first,
and that requires cooperation and economic interactions with the major
powers of the world, including India.
India-China relations no longer centre on one or two issues, where New Delhi and Beijing have serious differences; their relationship needs to be seen holistically and here both converge on many global issues.
Secondly,
China had belied similar apprehensions of siding with Pakistan during
the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, much to the disappointment of
Islamabad. And those were the years when India-China relations were
virtually non-existent (following the 1962 War). Compared to the
situation prevailing then, India-China relations now are not only normal
but also multipronged.
Thirdly, two-front wars have been almost a
rarity in the recent history. One may argue that in this century, the
United States has fought both in Afghanistan and Iraq simultaneously,
but strictly speaking, both these countries were in the midst of civil
wars and American intervention was meant to support one faction against
the other; these cannot be called full-fledged wars against Afghanistan
or Iraq.
And that brings us to the third question, of whether the
Indian Air Force can fight a two-front war credibly. Here, the word
'winning' is avoided deliberately as modern wars are going to be
non-nuclear, very short and intense; the world community at large will
not allow a full-fledged war among the major powers to continue for
months without risking a World War III.
That is why even the tiny
Taiwan (which China describes as its renegade province) is not scared of
China as it is confident that its military is strong enough to resist
the Chinese forces for at least a week, during which time the world
community will surely intervene to stop the war.
Against this
backdrop, it may be highlighted here that in his letter last week to his
officers, Dhanoa talked of preparing for operations "with our present
holdings". What he implied was that India's present holdings may not be
good enough, but still, we have to do our duty with what we have.
It is equally noteworthy that as the deputy air chief last year, Dhanoa had clearly admitted that the IAF did not have enough numbers in case a two-front war involving China and Pakistan broke out.
Almost
half of the fighter planes currently in use by the IAF are set to be
decommissioned over the next nine years. Presently, IAF has 35 active
fighter squadrons against a government authorised strength of 42
Squadrons (going by IAF’s estimate, India actually needs 45 squadrons),
though, according to the latest Parliamentary Standing Committee report
on Defence, the actual strength may be down to 25 squadrons.
As
the Committee has pointed out, of the 25 active fighter squadrons, 14
are equipped with MiG-21s and MiG-27s, which will retire between 2015
and 2024. Thus, the strength will be reduced to just 11 squadrons by
2024. The Committee is right to conclude that the widening gap
occurs because the rate at which fighter aircraft are retiring after
completion of their total technical life exceeds the rate at which their
replacements are being inducted into the IAF.
The only saving
grace, however, is that the IAF has contracted for 272 Su-30 MKI fighter
aircraft to form 13 Squadrons and the delivery of these aircraft is
likely to be completed by 2020. This means that the air Force will be
able to add 13 squadrons in its kitty only by 2020. Of course,
there are additional plans for the series production of Light Combat
Aircraft (LCA) Tejas, development of the fifth generation aircraft with
Russia and acquiring of the Rafale. But, overall, the situation is far
from satisfactory.
Roughly speaking, India may have a distinct
advantage over Pakistan – our Army capability is around twice that of
Pakistan, IAF is 1.6 times bigger and Indian Navy is around three times
more capable – but when it comes to China, the situation is just the
reverse. So, on paper, India fares poorly vis-a-vis the combined might
of Pakistan and China until and unless we increase by at least 50
percent our capital-budgetary allocations for our armed forces.
However, all this is not to suggest that we will not be able to hold our ground in a “short” two-front war (as already explained, there will be a short war, if in case there is one).
Talking specifically
of the IAF, we will have an initial advantage over even the Chinese as
unlike ours, their air force planes will be taking off from high
altitude airfields and hence would carry less amount of ordinance and
fuel payload (the Chinese do not have enough mid-air refuellers),
affecting their performance.
Along with MiG-29s, Mirage-2000s
(both versatile air fighters), C-17 Globemaster-III transport aircraft
(manufactured by Boeing) and the Lockheed Martin-manufactured C-130J
Super Hercules airlifters, our air assets also include the Sukhoi
Su-30MKI, that has a range of 3,000 km on internal fuel and can carry
out a 3.75 hour combat mission. The Su-30s are extraordinary
fighters with both range and speed – 2120 km/h – and can easily move
between the Pakistan and China without undergoing any refueling and
rearming; they can strike targets in Tibet as well as Pakistan.
India’s
double advantage over its adversaries is provided by the BrahMos cruise
missiles, which have changed the nature of air power considerably. With
a speed of Mach 2.8, that translates to 952 meters per second, these
missiles make virtual radars of the enemies defunct in the sense that
even if they are detected at a range of 30 kilometres, they will give
the enemy less than 30 seconds before they are tracked, illuminated and
shot down.
The result could be that the BrahMos missiles can cause
incalculable damage to the enemy’s defences, tanks, air bases, ships,
and command and communication centres, a task which, earlier, was
assigned to a fighter pilot with jet fighters. And, what is more
important, the BrahMos missiles are produced in India itself, in a joint
venture with Russia.
In conclusion, the IAF can defend the
country in a short and sudden two-front war. However, things will be
uncertain if the war gets prolonged.